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CYCLIC LATTICES, AND EFFICIENT
ONE-WAY FUNCTIONS
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Abstract. We investigate the average-case complexity of a general-
ization of the compact knapsack problem to arbitrary rings: given m
(random) ring elements a1, . . . , am ∈ R and a (random) target value
b ∈ R, ﬁnd coeﬃcients x1, . . . , xm ∈ S (where S is an appropriately cho-
sen subset of R) such that
∑
ai · xi = b. We consider compact versions
of the generalized knapsack where the set S is large and the number of
weights m is small. Most variants of this problem considered in the past
(e.g., when R = Z is the ring of the integers) can be easily solved in
polynomial time even in the worst case. We propose a new choice of the
ring R and subset S that yields generalized compact knapsacks that are
seemingly very hard to solve on the average, even for very small values
of m. Namely, we prove that for any unbounded function m = ω(1) with
arbitrarily slow growth rate, solving our generalized compact knapsack
problems on the average is at least as hard as the worst-case instance of
various approximation problems over cyclic lattices. Speciﬁc worst-case
lattice problems considered in this paper are the shortest independent
vector problem SIVP and the guaranteed distance decoding problem
GDD (a variant of the closest vector problem, CVP) for approximation
factors n1+ almost linear in the dimension of the lattice.
Our results yield very eﬃcient and provably secure one-way functions
(based on worst-case complexity assumptions) with key size and time
complexity almost linear in the security parameter n. Previous con-
structions with similar security guarantees required quadratic key size
and computation time. Our results can also be formulated as a con-
nection between the worst-case and average-case complexity of various
lattice problems over cyclic and quasi-cyclic lattices.
Keywords. Knapsack problem, cyclic lattices, average-case complexity,
one-way functions.
Subject classification. 68Q17, 11H06, 94B15.
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1. Introduction
Few problems in the theory of computational complexity and its application
to the foundations of cryptography have been as controversial as the knapsack
problem and its many variants, including the notorious NP-hard subset-sum
problem (Karp 1972). The initial enthusiasm generated by the subset-sum
based cryptosystem of Merkle & Hellman (1978) in the late 70’s was immedi-
ately followed by intensive cryptanalytic eﬀorts that culminated in the early
80’s with the total break of the system in its basic (Shamir 1984) and iterated
version (Brickell 1984). Still, the possibility of building cryptographic functions
based on NP-hard problems, and the relatively high speed at which numbers
can be added up (compared to modular multiplication and exponentiation op-
erations required by number theoretic functions), prompted many researchers
to suggest variants, ﬁxes, and improvements (e.g., Chor & Rivest 1988; Good-
man & McAuley 1984) to the initial Merkle–Hellman proposal. These eﬀorts,
which lasted for more than a decade, were invariably followed by attacks (e.g.,
Joux & Stern 1993; Nguyen & Stern 1997; Odlyzko 1989; Schnorr & Ho¨rner
1995) that seriously questioned the security of the systems either in theory or in
practice. Recently, knapsack-like cryptographic functions have started attract-
ing again considerable attention after Ajtai’s discovery (Ajtai 2004) that the
generalized subset-sum problem (over the additive group Znp of n-dimensional
vectors modulo p) is provably hard to solve on the average based on a worst-
case intractability assumption about certain lattice approximation problems
for which no polynomial-time solution is known. Following Ajtai (2004), Ajtai
& Dwork (1997) also proposed a public-key cryptosystem with similar security
properties. But, unfortunately, even this proposal with strong theoretical secu-
rity guarantees has been subject to practical attacks (Nguyen & Stern 1998).
Attacks to subset-sum (or more generally knapsack) problems can be clas-
siﬁed into two broad categories:
1. attacks targeted to speciﬁc public-key cryptosystems that try to exploit
the special structure resulting from the embedding of a decryption trap-
door (e.g., Shamir 1984); and
2. attacks to generic subset-sum or knapsack instances that can be applied
regardless of the existence of a trapdoor (e.g., Coster et al. 1992; Lagarias
& Odlyzko 1985).
The ﬁrst class of attacks is usually stronger, meaning that it gives asymptot-
ically good algorithms that succeed (with high probability) regardless of the
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value of the security parameter, but only applies to speciﬁc public-key cryp-
tosystems whose underlying knapsack problems are not as hard as the general
case. The second class of attacks is more general but only heuristic: the asymp-
totic complexity of these attacks is usually exponential, or their success rate
negligible as a function of the security parameter. These methods are evaluated
experimentally by testing them on speciﬁc problem instances (e.g., challenges
or randomly generated ciphertexts) for typical values of the security param-
eter, and attacks can be usually avoided setting the security parameter to a
suﬃciently large value. Still, the eﬀectiveness of these attacks, even for mod-
erately large values of the security parameter, is currently considered the main
practical obstacle to the design of cryptographic functions based on variants of
the knapsack problem.
It is important to realize that the second class of attacks dismisses most
knapsack cryptographic functions as practical alternatives to number theory
based functions, not on the grounds of their inherent insecurity, but simply
because of the large key sizes required to avoid heuristic attacks. In fact (es-
pecially if one drops the more ambitious goal of designing a public-key cryp-
tosystem, and more modestly attempts to design cryptographic primitives with
no trapdoors, like pseudo-random generators or one-way hash functions, etc.)
there is theoretical evidence (Ajtai 2004; Ajtai & Dwork 1997; Impagliazzo &
Naor 1996; Regev 2004b) that subset-sum can indeed be a good source of com-
putational hardness, at least from an asymptotic point of view. The main issue
aﬀecting the practical security of knapsack functions is eﬃciency. In a typical
knapsack function, the key (corresponding to security parameter n) consists of
Ω(n) numbers, each of which is n bits long. Therefore, the size of the resulting
cryptographic key grows as Ω(n2). Even if all known attacks to knapsack have
exponential time complexity, one needs to set n to at least a few hundreds to
make heuristic approaches (most notably lattice basis reduction, see Joux &
Stern 1998; Lenstra et al. 1982; Nguyen & Stern 2000, 2001; Schnorr & Euchner
1994) ineﬀective or too costly. As a consequence, the resulting key can easily
reach megabit sizes still without achieving a suﬃcient degree of security. Even
if knapsack functions can still be competitive from a running time point of view,
these huge key sizes are considered too big for most practical applications.
Generalized compact knapsacks. The impact of space eﬃciency on the
practical security of knapsack based functions has long been recognized, even
before the development of ingenious lattice-based attacks. A simple improve-
ment that comes to mind is to use a so-called compact knapsack: instead of
using 0–1 combinations of Ω(n) input weights (resulting in Ω(n2) key size), con-
368 Micciancio cc 16 (2007)
sider a smaller (constant, or slowly increasing) number of weights a1, . . . , am
and combine them with coeﬃcients from a larger set, e.g., {0, . . . , 2δn} for some
small constant δ > 0. Notice that if δ = 0, then we get the usual subset-sum
problem, which can be solved (for m = O(logn)) in polynomial time using
exhaustive search. However, if δ = Ω(1) then the search space becomes ex-
ponentially large, and exhaustive search is infeasible. Suggestions of this type
appear already in Merkle and Hellman’s original paper (Merkle & Hellman
1978) and subsequent works as a method to increase the bandwidth of the
scheme. These early attempts to reduce the key size of knapsack based func-
tions were subject to attacks even more devastating than the general case: in
Amirazizi et al. (1983) it is observed that the problem easily reduces to an
integer programming instance with O(m) variables, and therefore it can be
solved in polynomial time for any constant value of m(n) = O(1), or even any
slowly growing function m(n) = O(logn/ log log n). Attempts to use compact
knapsacks to design eﬃcient cryptographic functions persisted during the 90’s
(Lin et al. 1995; Orton 1994), but were always followed by cryptanalytic attacks
(Cusick 1995; Lee & Park 1999; Ritter 1996).
In this paper we introduce and study a new class of compact knapsacks
which are both very eﬃcient and provably hard to solve in a strong sense sim-
ilar to Ajtai’s function (Ajtai 2004). The one-way function proposed by Ajtai
(2004) can be described as a generalization of the integer knapsack problem
to arbitrary rings. Speciﬁcally, for any ring R and subset S ⊂ R, consider
the following problem: given ring elements a1, . . . , am ∈ R and a target value
b ∈ R, ﬁnd coeﬃcients xi ∈ S such that
∑m
i=1 ai · xi = b, where all operations
are performed in the ring. In Ajtai’s work, R is the product ring1 Znp of n-
dimensional vectors modulo p (for some polynomially bounded p(n) = nO(1))
and S = {0, 1} consists of the additive and multiplicative identities of the ring.
In particular, S has size 2, and the problem can be solved by exhaustive search
in polynomial time when m = O(logn).
In this paper we study compact versions of the generalized knapsack prob-
lem, where the set S has size much larger than 2, so that exhaustive search
is infeasible even for very small values of m. In the case of the ring Znp , the
ﬁrst idea that comes to mind is to use as coeﬃcients the set S = {0, 1}n of all
binary vectors, or, more generally, the set S = {0, . . . , pδ}n of n-dimensional
vectors with entries much smaller than p. Unfortunately, as for the case of the
integer compact knapsack problem described above, this straightforward con-
struction admits much faster solutions than exhaustive search: the resulting
1The product ring Rn is the set of n-tuples with entries in R, with the component-wise
addition and multiplication operations.
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generalized compact knapsack is equivalent to n independent instances of the
knapsack problem modulo p, which can be eﬃciently solved in the worst case
for any polynomially bounded p(n) = nO(1) by dynamic programming, and on
the average for p(n) = nO(log n) using the methods of Flaxman & Przydatek
(2005) and Lyubashevsky (2005).
Our contribution. The main contribution of this paper is the study of a
new class of compact knapsack functions fa(x) =
∑
i ai · xi that are provably
hard to invert in a very strong sense, even when the number m of weights is
very small. In particular, we prove that, for appropriate choice of ring R and
subset S ⊂ R, and for any unbounded function m(n) = ω(1) (with arbitrarily
slow growth rate) the compact knapsack function is at least as hard to invert on
the average (even with non-negligible probability) as the worst-case instance of
various lattice problems (for the special class of cyclic lattices, i.e., lattices that
are invariant under cyclic rotations of the coordinates) for which no polynomial
time algorithm is known.
Our generalized knapsack problems are deﬁned by the ring R = Znp of n-
dimensional vectors modulo a prime p with the componentwise addition and
convolution product operations. As in the previously discussed compact variant
of Ajtai’s function, the set S = {0, . . . , pδ}n consists of all n-dimensional vec-
tors with small entries. Remarkably, using the convolution product operation
(as opposed to componentwise multiplication) makes the problem considerably
harder: solving random instances of our generalized compact knapsacks with
non-negligible probability is as hard as approximating the shortest independent
vector problem (as well as various other lattice problems) on cyclic lattices in
the worst case within factors n1+ (for any  > 0) almost linear in the dimension
of the lattice.
This results in strong one-way functions with average-case security guar-
antees based on a worst-case intractability assumption similar to Ajtai’s func-
tion (Ajtai 2004) (and subsequent improvements of Cai & Nerurkar 1997; Mic-
ciancio 2004; Micciancio & Regev 2007) but with a much smaller key size
O(m log pn) = ω(1) · n log n, where ω(1) is an unbounded function with arbi-
trarily slow growth rate. (For comparison, Ajtai (2004); Cai & Nerurkar (1997);
Micciancio (2004); Micciancio & Regev (2007) require m(n) = Ω(n log n), and
key size Ω(n2 log2 n).)
Our compact knapsack functions are also extremely fast, as, for appro-
priate choice of the parameters, they can be computed in almost linear time
O(n logc n) using the fast Fourier transform (FFT) in the evaluation of the con-
volution products. Speciﬁcally, the cost of evaluating our functions is equiv-
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alent to computing an almost constant number ω(1) of FFT operations on
n-dimensional vectors modulo a small prime p = nO(1). The almost linear time
evaluation algorithm together with the substantially smaller key size, make
our generalized compact knapsack function even much faster than the already
attractive subset-sum function.
In the process of establishing our hardness result, we prove various prop-
erties of our knapsack functions that might be of independent interest. In
particular, we prove that our compact knapsack function fa(x) has very small
collision probability, when the input is chosen uniformly at random. By a re-
sult of Rackoﬀ (reported in Impagliazzo & Zuckerman 1989), this is enough to
guarantee that the value fa(x) (for randomly chosen a and x) is almost uni-
formly distributed over Znp and independent from a = (a1, . . . , am). Moreover,
this is true for arbitrary small values of m(n) = ω(1). Previous results of this
kind for the subset-sum function relied on the additive structure of Znp alone,
and required m = Ω(n log p). Our proof makes substantial use of the multi-
plicative structure of the ring Znp (with the convolution product operation) and
the characterization of its ideals as polynomial quotient rings.
Beside the technical contribution of a very eﬃcient and provably secure
one-way function based on a worst-case complexity assumption, we view the
following as additional contributions of this paper: the introduction of the class
of cyclic lattices as a source of interesting computational problems; casting a
new light on the complexity of the compact knapsack problem showing that if
the ring is appropriately chosen the problem can be substantially harder than
the integer case; and demonstrating that the techniques initially developed by
Ajtai (2004); Micciancio & Regev (2007) can be useful to study seemingly diﬀer-
ent problems, and still produce the same kind of strong worst-case/average-case
security guarantees. In our view all these contributions are important steps to-
ward the development of cryptographic functions that are both eﬃcient and
provably secure in a very strong sense. Finally, we remark that the problem of
inverting our generalized compact knapsack function can be equivalently for-
mulated as the problem of ﬁnding a lattice point (in a quasi-cyclic2 lattice)
close to a given target. (See Section 5 for details.) Therefore, our main re-
sult is interesting also from a purely complexity theoretic perspective, since it
establishes a connection between the worst-case and average-case complexity
of solving various lattice problems on (quasi-)cyclic lattices. This is analo-
gous to previous results (Ajtai 2004; Cai & Nerurkar 1997; Goldreich et al.
1996; Micciancio 2004; Micciancio & Regev 2007) connecting the worst-case
2A lattice it is called quasi-cyclic if it is invariant under rotations of the coordinates by a
number of positions possibly greater than 1.
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and average-case complexity of problems on arbitrary lattices, but adapted to
the special class of lattices with (quasi-)cyclic structure.
Related work. The ﬁrst construction of one-way function that is provably
secure based on a worst-case complexity assumption was given by Ajtai (2004).
Subsequent work (Cai & Nerurkar 1997; Micciancio 2004; Micciancio & Regev
2007) focused on weakening the required worst-case complexity assumption. In
this paper, the goal is to improve the eﬃciency of the one-way function.
This paper is an almost complete rewriting and substantial improvement
of an extended abstract (Micciancio 2002a) presented at FOCS 2002. In par-
ticular, in (Micciancio 2002a) the author proved that solving the generalized
compact knapsack on the average when m = O(logn) is at least as hard as
approximating various lattice problems in the worst case within a factor n3+.
Here, we prove a new regularity theorem for compact knapsack functions (The-
orem 4.2) and incorporate the recently developed Gaussian distribution tech-
niques of Micciancio & Regev (2007) to obtain an improved result that holds
for any function m = ω(1) with arbitrarily slow growth rate, and worst-case
approximation factors n1+, almost linear in the dimension of the lattice.
Following the writing of this paper, it has been shown (Lyubashevsky &
Micciancio 2006; Peikert & Rosen 2006) that variants of our generalized com-
pact knapsack function are not only one way, but also collision resistant, a
stronger and very useful cryptographic property. These improvements and re-
lated open problems are discussed in Section 5.
From a theoretical point of view, the main diﬀerence between our one-way
functions and those studied in previous work (e.g., Ajtai (2004); Micciancio
& Regev (2007) and related papers,) is that our functions are based on the
worst-case intractability of lattice problems on a class of lattices with a special
cyclic structure. Many lattice problems are known to be NP-hard even in
their approximation versions for suﬃciently small approximation factors. For
example, the shortest vector problem (SVP) is NP-hard (under randomized
reductions) to approximate within any constant factor (Ajtai 1998; Khot 2005;
Micciancio 2001c), while the closest vector problem (CVP) is NP-hard to
approximate even within quasi polynomial factors nO(1/ log log n) (Arora et al.
1997; Dinur et al. 2003; van Emde Boas 1981). These results support the
conjecture that lattice problems are hard to solve in the worst case, at least for
arbitrary lattices. It is natural to ask whether lattice problems remain hard
even when the input lattice is cyclic.
Very little is known about the computational complexity of lattice problems
on cyclic lattices. In fact, as far as we know, cyclic lattices have received little
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or no attention so far. From an algorithmic point of view, it is not clear how to
exploit the cyclic structure of the lattice in state of the art lattice algorithms,
e.g., lattice basis reduction. The only algorithmic results related to cyclic lat-
tices we are aware of are (Gentry & Szydlo 2002; Howgrave-Graham & Szydlo
2004; May & Silverman 2001; Szydlo 2003). The ﬁrst paper (May & Silverman
2001) shows how the solution of certain lattice problems can be speeded up by
a factor n when the lattice is cyclic of dimension n. This is a quite modest
improvement since the running time of the best algorithms to solve these prob-
lems over general lattices is exponential in n. A more interesting algorithmic
result is given by Gentry & Szydlo (2002); Howgrave-Graham & Szydlo (2004);
Szydlo (2003). The problem considered by Howgrave-Graham & Szydlo (2004)
(and solved building on previous algorithms of Gentry & Szydlo 2002; Szydlo
2003) is the following: given the autocorrelation3 of a vector x, retrieve x. This
problem (which arises from applications in n-dimensional crystallography) is re-
lated to cyclic lattices by the fact that the autocorrelation of x can be expressed
as a vector in the cyclic lattice generated by x. This problem is quite diﬀer-
ent from the worst-case computational problems on cyclic lattices considered
in this paper, and it is not clear if the techniques of Gentry & Szydlo (2002);
Howgrave-Graham & Szydlo (2004); Szydlo (2003) can be used to speed up the
solution of other problems, like SVP, CVP or their variants SIVP (shortest
independent vector problem) and GDD (guaranteed distance decoding) over
cyclic lattices. Based on the current state of knowledge, it seems reasonable
to conjecture that approximation problems on cyclic lattices are computation-
ally hard, at least in the worst case and for small polynomial approximation
factors. In order to further support this conjecture, it would be nice to prove
NP-hardness results for lattice problems when restricted to cyclic lattices.
We remark that our deﬁnition of cyclic lattices is analogous to the deﬁnition
of cyclic codes, one of the most useful and widely studied classes of codes in
coding theory. Still, no polynomial time algorithm is known for many compu-
tational problems on cyclic codes (or lattices). A very recent result somehow
suggesting that no such polynomial time algorithm may exist is the proof in
Guruswami & Vardy (2005) that the nearest codeword problem (the coding
analogue of the closest vector problem for lattices) for appropriately shortened
Reed–Solomon codes is NP-hard. Reed–Solomon codes are a well known class
of cyclic codes, so the result in Guruswami & Vardy (2005) seems to suggest
that the nearest codeword problem is hard even when the code is cyclic. Unfor-
tunately, shortening the Reed–Solomon code (as done in Guruswami & Vardy
3The autocorrelation of a vector x is the convolution of x with itself x⊗x. See Section 2
for a deﬁnition of the convolution product ⊗.
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2005) destroys the cyclic structure of the code, so, the results in Guruswami &
Vardy (2005) do not imply the NP-hardness of the nearest codeword problem
over cyclic codes. We leave, as an open problem, to prove hardness results
for any lattice or coding problem over cyclic lattices or codes. Is the shortest
vector problem on cyclic lattices NP-hard? Is the shortest independent vector
problem on cyclic lattices NP-hard? What about the closest vector problem
on cyclic lattices? Is the closest vector problem NP-hard even for ﬁxed families
of cyclic lattices as shown (for arbitrary lattices) in Feige & Micciancio (2004);
Micciancio (2001a); Regev (2004a)?
Organization. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we
recall basic notation, deﬁnitions and results needed in this paper. In Section 3
we prove two preliminary lemmas about cyclic lattices that will be used in the
proof of our main result. In Section 4 we present the main technical result of
the paper: we formally deﬁne our generalized compact knapsack function, and
prove that inverting the function on the average is at least as hard as the worst-
case instance of various lattice problems on cyclic lattices. In the process, we
also establish various other properties of our compact knapsack function that
might be of independent interest, e.g., we bound the collision probability of the
function, and prove that the function is almost regular. Section 5 concludes
with a discussion additional related results and open problems.
2. Preliminaries
In this section we introduce some notational conventions, and recall basic def-
initions and results about the statistical distance, hash functions, lattices and
Gaussian probability distributions.
For any real r ≥ 0, [r] denotes the set {0, . . . , r} of all non-negative
integers not greater than r. The uniform probability distribution over a set
S is denoted U(S). We use the standard asymptotic notation f = O(g) (or
g = Ω(f)) when lim supn→∞ |f(n)/g(n)| < ∞, f = o(g) (or g = ω(f)) when
limn→∞ |f(n)/g(n)| = 0, and f = Θ(g) when f = O(g) and f = Ω(g). A func-
tion f(n) is negligible (denoted f(n) = n−ω(1)) if for every c there exists an n0
such that |f(n)| < 1/nc for all n > n0.
2.1. Statistical distance. The statistical distance is a measure of how two
probability distributions are far apart from each other, and it is a convenient
tool in the analysis of randomized algorithms and reductions. In this subsection
we deﬁne the statistical distance and state some simple facts that will be used in
the analysis of the reductions in this paper. All the properties of the statistical
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distance stated in this subsection are easily veriﬁed. For more details the reader
is referred to Micciancio & Goldwasser (2002, Chapter 8).
Definition 2.1. Let X and Y be two discrete random variables over a (count-
able) set A. The statistical distance between X and Y is the quantity





|Pr {X = a} − Pr {Y = a}| .
In the case of continuous random variables, the statistical distance between X
and Y is





|δX(a)− δY (a)|da ,
where δX and δY are the probability density functions of X and Y respectively.
We say that two random variables X, Y are identically distributed (written
X ≡ Y ) if and only if Pr {X ∈ S} = Pr {Y ∈ S} for every S ⊆ A. The reader
can easily check that the statistical distance satisﬁes the usual properties of
distance functions, i.e., Δ(X, Y ) ≥ 0 (with equality if and only if X ≡ Y ),
Δ(X, Y ) = Δ(Y,X), and Δ(X,Z) ≤ Δ(X, Y ) + Δ(Y, Z).
The following proposition shows that applying a (possibly randomized)
function to two distributions does not increase the statistical distance.
Proposition 2.2. Let X, Y be two random variables taking values in a com-
mon set A. For any (possibly randomized) function f with domain A, the




) ≤ Δ(X, Y ) .
As a corollary, we easily obtain the following.
Corollary 2.4. If X and Y are random variables over set A and p : A →
{0, 1} is a predicate, then
(2.5)
∣
∣Pr {p(X) = 1} − Pr {p(Y ) = 1} ∣∣ ≤ Δ(X, Y ) .
Another useful property of the statistical distance is the following.
Proposition 2.6. Let X1, . . . , Xk and Y1, . . . , Yk be two lists of totally inde-
pendent random variables. Then
(2.7) Δ
(
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2.2. One-way hash function families. A function family {fa : X → R}a∈A
is a collection of functions (indexed by a set of keys A) with a common do-
main X and range R. A (polynomial) function ensemble is a sequence {fa :
Xn → Rn}a∈An of function families (indexed by a security parameter n ∈ N)
such that log |An|, log |Xn| and log |Rn| are all polynomial in n. We assume
that the elements of the sets An, Xn and Rn can be eﬃciently represented with
log2 |An|, log2 |Xn| and log2 |Rn| bits respectively, membership in the sets can
be decided in polynomial time, and there is a probabilistic polynomial time
algorithm to sample from those sets with (almost) uniform distribution. It is
also common to assume that the functions fa are eﬃciently computable, in the
sense that there is a polynomial time algorithm that on input n, a ∈ An and
x ∈ Xn, outputs fa(x). All function ensembles considered in this paper have
these properties, namely the sets An, Xn, Rn have eﬃcient representations and
the functions fa are eﬃciently computable.
A function (ensemble) is one-way if it is (easy to compute, but) compu-
tationally hard to invert, i.e., no algorithm can eﬃciently solve the following
function inversion problem: given a pair (a, r) ∈ An×Rn, ﬁnd an x ∈ Xn such
that fa(x) = r. One-wayness is an average-case complexity property, i.e., it
requires that the function inversion problem is computationally hard when the
input (a, r) ∈ An×Rn is selected at random. The exact deﬁnition, for the case
of function ensembles, is given below.
Definition 2.8. A function ensemble {fa : Xn → Rn}a∈An is one-way if for






when a ∈ An and x ∈ Xn are selected uniformly at random, is negligible in n.
Notice that the input distribution underlying the deﬁnition of one-way func-
tion is not the uniform distribution over An ×Rn, but rather it corresponds to
choosing the target value r ∈ Rn as the image of a uniformly random solution
x ∈ X. For any function ensemble H = {fa : X → R}a∈A, we write owf(H)
to denote the probability distribution {(a, fa(x)) : a ∈ An, x ∈ Xn} underlying
the deﬁnition of one-way function, and U(A×R) to denote the uniform prob-
ability distribution over A× R. We remark that Deﬁnition 2.8 corresponds to
the notion of strong one-way function, i.e., it is required that the success prob-
ability of any probabilistic polynomial time algorithm in solving the function
inversion problem (when the input is chosen according to distribution owf(H))
is negligible.
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The function families H = {fa : X → R}a∈A considered in this paper
have the property that the input size log |X| is strictly bigger than the output
size log |R|, i.e., the functions “compress” the size of the input by a factor
log |X|/ log |R|. Such functions have many important applications in computer
science and cryptography, and are generically called hash functions. In order
to be useful, hash functions must satisfy some additional properties. A typical
requirement is that if a ∈ A and x ∈ X are chosen uniformly at random, the
distribution of fa(x) ∈ R is almost uniform and independent from a. In other
words, owf(H) is statistically close to the uniform distribution U(A× R).
Definition 2.9. Let H = {fa : X → R}a∈A be a hash function family. We
say that H is -regular if the statistical distance between owf(H) and the
uniform distribution U(A × R) is at most . A hash function ensemble {Hn}
is called almost regular if there exists a negligible function (n) = n−ω(1) such
that Hn is (n)-regular for every n.
We remark that if a function is -regular for  = 0, then the function
maps the uniform input distribution to the uniform output distribution. So,
Deﬁnition 2.9 is a generalization of the standard notion of regular function.
2.3. Lattices. Throughout the paper, we use column notation for all vectors,
and use (·)T to denote the matrix transposition operation. For example, x =
(x1, . . . , xn)
T is the n-dimensional column vector with entries x1, . . . , xn, and
[x, . . . ,x] is the n× n matrix with all columns equal to x.




xibi : xi ∈ Z
}
of n linearly independent vectors b1, . . . ,bn in R
n. The set of vectors b1, . . . ,bn
is called a basis for the lattice, and can be compactly represented by the matrix
B = [b1, . . . ,bn] ∈ Rn×n having the basis vectors as columns. The lattice gen-
erated by B is denoted L(B). Notice that L(B) = {Bx : x ∈ Zn}, where Bx
is the usual matrix-vector multiplication. For any basis B, we deﬁne the fun-
damental parallelepiped P(B) = {Bx : ∀i.0 ≤ xi < 1}. The following lemma
shows how to sample lattice points uniformly at random from the fundamental
parallelepiped associated to a given sublattice.
4For simplicity, is this paper we restrict all deﬁnitions to full dimensional lattices.
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Lemma 2.10 (cf. Micciancio & Goldwasser 2002, Proposition 8.2). There is a
probabilistic polynomial time algorithm that on input a lattice B and a full
rank sublattice S ⊂ L(B), outputs a lattice point x ∈ L(B) ∩ P(S) chosen
uniformly at random.
The dual of a lattice L(B) (denoted L(B)∗) is the lattice generated by the
matrix (B−1)T , and consists of all vectors that have integer scalar product with
all lattice vectors.
For any vector x = (x1, . . . , xn)
T , deﬁne the cyclic rotation
rot(x) = (xn, x1, . . . , xn−1)T ,
and the corresponding circulant matrix
Rot(x) =
[
x, rot(x), rot2(x), . . . , rotn−1(x)
]
.
(Notice that x, and roti(x) are all column vectors, and Rot(x) is the matrix
whose columns are the cyclic rotations of x by construction. It is easy to see
that also the rows of Rot(x) are all rotations of the same vector but with the
entries in reverse order. For example, the last row of Rot(x) is (xn, . . . , x1).) A
lattice L(B) is cyclic if it is closed under the rotation operation, i.e., if x ∈ L(B)
implies rot(x) ∈ L(B). It is easy to see that a lattice is cyclic if and only if
L(B) = rot(L(B)).
The convolution product of two vectors x and y is the vector
x⊗ y = Rot(x) · y = x · y1 + rot(x) · y2 + · · ·+ rotn−1(x) · yn




xi · yj ,
e.g., (x ⊗ y)n = xny1 + xn−1y2 + · · · + x1yn. It can be easily veriﬁed that
the convolution product is associative and commutative, i.e., it satisﬁes the
equational axioms x ⊗ (y ⊗ z) = (x ⊗ y) ⊗ z, and x ⊗ y = y ⊗ x. Moreover,
it distributes over the vector addition operation: (x+ y)⊗ z = x⊗ z+ y ⊗ z.
Therefore, (Rn,+,⊗) is a commutative ring with identity e1 = (1, 0, . . . , 0)T .
The Euclidean norm of a vector x is the quantity ‖x‖ = √∑i x2i . Other
norms used in this paper are the 1 norm ‖x‖1 =
∑
i |xi| and the max norm
‖x‖∞ = maxi |xi|. These norms and the convolution product are related by the
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following inequalities, valid for any n-dimensional vectors x,y ∈ Rn:
‖x‖ ≤ ‖x‖1 ≤
√
n‖x‖(2.11)
‖x‖∞ ≤ ‖x‖ ≤
√
n‖x‖∞(2.12)
‖x⊗ y‖∞ ≤ ‖x‖ · ‖y‖(2.13)
‖x⊗ y‖∞ ≤ ‖x‖1 · ‖y‖∞ .(2.14)
For any matrix or set of vectors S, we denote by ‖S‖ = maxi ‖si‖ the norm of
the longest (column) vector in S.
The minimum distance of a lattice L(B), denoted λ1(L(B)), is the minimum
distance between any two (distinct) lattice points and equals the length of the
shortest nonzero lattice vector:
λ1
(L(B)) = min{dist(x,y) : x = y ∈ L(B)}
= min
{‖x‖ : x ∈ L(B) \ {0}} .
The notion of minimum distance can be generalized to deﬁne the ith succes-
sive minimum λi as the smallest radius r such that the closed sphere B¯(r) =












Another important constant associated to a lattice is the covering radius. The
covering radius ρ(L(B)) of a lattice is the maximum distance dist(x,L(B))






x,L(B)) : x ∈ Rn
}
.
A sublattice of L(B) is a (full rank) lattice L(S) such that L(S) ⊆ L(B).
In many algorithmic problems on point lattices the quality of a solution is
measured with respect to some speciﬁc lattice parameter, e.g., the length λ1 of
the shortest nonzero vector, or the radius λn of the smallest sphere containing n
linearly independent lattice vectors. For example, the γ(n)-approximate short-
est vector problem asks to ﬁnd a nonzero vector in a lattice L(B) of length at
most γ(n) · λ1(L(B)), where n is the rank of the lattice. For technical reasons,
in this paper we consider generalized versions of various lattice problems where
the quality of the solution is measured with respect to an arbitrary function of
the lattice φ(L(B)). The ﬁrst of these problems is the following generalization
of the shortest independent vector problem introduced by Micciancio (2004).
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Definition 2.15. The (generalized) shortest independent vectors problem5
SIVPφγ , given an n-dimensional lattice B, asks for a set of n linearly indepen-
dent lattice vectors S ⊂ L(B) such that ‖S‖ ≤ γ(n) · φ(L(B)).
The shortest independent vectors problem SIVPγ (studied by Blo¨mer &
Seifert (1999) and used by Ajtai (2004); Cai & Nerurkar (1997); Micciancio
(2004); Micciancio & Regev (2007) as a source of computational hardness) cor-
responds to SIVPφγ with φ = λn. Another problem that will play a fundamental
role in this paper is the following.
Definition 2.16. The guaranteed distance decoding problem (GDDφγ), given
a lattice B and a target point t ∈ span(B), asks for a lattice point x ∈ L(B)
such that dist(t,x) ≤ γ(n) · φ(L(B)), where n is the rank of the lattice.
This time it is natural to set φ = ρ to the covering radius of the lattice,
because for any lattice basis B and target t ∈ Rn, there is always a lattice
point within distance ρ(L(B)) from t. When φ = ρ, we omit the superscript,
and simply write GDDγ. GDDγ is an interesting variant of the closest vector
problem (CVP), where the quality of the solution is measured with respect to
the worst possible distance maxt∈Rn dist(t,L(B)) rather then the distance of
the given target dist(t,L(B)).
No polynomial time algorithm to solve SIVPγ or GDDγ within polynomial
approximation factors γ(n) = nO(1) is known. A well known polynomial time
algorithm for approximating SIVP is the basis reduction algorithm of Lenstra
et al. (1982), which on input a lattice B, computes a so-called LLL-reduced
basis S for the same lattice. The exact deﬁnition of LLL-reduced basis is not
important here. All we need in this paper is that the LLL-reduced basis satisﬁes
‖S‖ ≤ 2nλn(L(B)), i.e., it solves SIVPγ for approximation factors γ(n) = 2n.
A well known method to ﬁnd lattice points close to a given target is Babai’s
nearest plane algorithm (Babai 1986). This is a polynomial time algorithm that
on input a lattice S and a target point t, ﬁnds a lattice vector x ∈ L(S) within
distance ‖x− t‖ ≤ (√n/2)‖S‖ from the target. Notice that the quality of the
solution depends on ‖S‖. For example, when used in conjunction with the LLL





n2nρ(L(B)) from the target, i.e., it solves
GDDγ for approximation factor γ(n) =
√
n2n. Slightly better approximations
(namely, for slightly subexponential factors 2O(n log log n/ log n)) can be computed
5In previous papers, this problem was denoted GIVP. Here we use the standard notation
for the shortest independent vector problem SIVP, annotated with the superscript φ.
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in (probabilistic) polynomial time using more complex algorithms (Ajtai et al.
2001; Schnorr 1987), but they oﬀer no advantages in the context of our paper.
2.4. Gaussian distributions. We use the Gaussian distribution techniques
recently introduced by Micciancio & Regev (2007) to simplify and improve the
results described in a preliminary version of this paper (Micciancio 2002a). In
this subsection we recall all the required deﬁnitions and results from Micciancio
& Regev (2007). For any vectors c,x and any s > 0, let
ρs,c(x) = e
−π‖(x−c)/s‖2
be a Gaussian function centered in c scaled by a factor of s. The total measure
associated to ρs,c is
∫




n)dx = 1 and
ρs,c/s
n is a probability density function. As noted in Micciancio & Regev
(2007), ρs,c/s
n can be expressed as the sum of n orthogonal 1-dimensional
Gaussian distributions, and each of them can be eﬃciently approximated with
arbitrary precision using standard techniques. So, the distribution ρs,c/s
n can
be eﬃciently approximated. For simplicity, in this paper we work with real
numbers and assume we can sample from ρs,c/s
n exactly. In practice, when
only ﬁnite precision is available, ρs,c/s
n can be approximated by picking a
ﬁne grid, and selecting points from the grid with probability approximately
proportional to ρs,c/s
n. All our arguments can be made rigorous by selecting
a suﬃciently ﬁne grid.
Functions are extended to sets in the usual way; e.g., ρs,c(A) =
∑
x∈A ρs,c(x)
for any countable set A. For any s, c and lattice Λ, deﬁne the discrete proba-





where x ∈ Λ. Intuitively, DΛ,s,c is the conditional probability6 that a random
variable with probability density function (ρs,c/s
n) takes the value x given
that the value of the random variable belongs to the lattice Λ. For brevity, we
sometimes omit s or c from the notation ρs,c and DΛ,s,c. When c or s are not
speciﬁed, we assume that they are the origin and 1 respectively.
In Micciancio & Regev (2007) Gaussian distributions are used to deﬁne a
new lattice invariant, called the smoothing parameter, deﬁned as follows.
6We are conditioning on an event that has probability 0; this can be made rigorous by
standard techniques.
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Definition 2.17. For an n-dimensional lattice Λ, and positive real  > 0, the
smoothing parameter η(Λ) is the smallest s such that ρ1/s(Λ
∗ \ {0}) ≤ .
In Micciancio & Regev (2007) many important properties of the smoothing
parameter are established. Here we only need the following three bounds.
The ﬁrst one shows that the smoothing parameter is the amount of Gaussian
noise that needs to be added to a lattice in order to get an almost uniform
distribution.
Lemma 2.18 (cf. Micciancio & Regev 2007, Lemma 4.1). Let (ρs/s
n mod B)
be the distribution obtained by sampling a point according to the probability
density function ρs/s
n and reducing the result modulo B. For any lattice L(B),
the statistical distance between ρs/s
n mod B and the uniform distribution over
P(B) is at most 1
2
ρ1/s(L(B)∗ \ {0}). In particular, if s ≥ η(L(B)), then the
distance Δ(ρs/s
n mod B, U(P(B))) is at most /2.
The second property shows that if s is suﬃciently large, then the central
second moment of the distribution DΛ,s,c is essentially the same as the one of
the continuous Gaussian distribution ρc,s/s
n.
Lemma 2.19 (cf. Micciancio & Regev 2007, Lemma 4.2). For any lattice Λ ⊂
R














The last property bounds the smoothing parameter in terms of λn.
Lemma 2.20 (cf. Micciancio & Regev 2007, Lemma 3.3). For any lattice Λ ⊂
R






In particular, for any super-logarithmic function ω(logn) there is a negligible
function (n) such that η(Λ) ≤
√
ω(logn) · λn.
3. Two lemmas about cyclic lattices
In this section we prove two preliminary lemmas about cyclic lattices that
will be used in the proof of our main results in the next section. The results
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are presented here because their formulation is largely independent from the
speciﬁc reduction in which they are used, and might be of independent interest.
The ﬁrst lemma gives an eﬃcient algorithm to select a (full rank) cyclic
lattice generated by a single short vector c from an arbitrary input lattice S.
We remark that the lemma below will be used in settings where the vectors in S
belong to a cyclic lattice L(B), so that the cyclic lattice L(Rot(c)) generated
by c ∈ L(S) is a sublattice of L(B). However, it is not generally the case that
L(Rot(c)) is a sublattice of L(S) because L(S) may not be cyclic.
Lemma 3.1. There exists a polynomial time algorithm that on input a full rank
n-dimensional lattice S, computes a vector c ∈ L(S) such that ‖c‖1 ≤ 2n · ‖S‖
and Rot(c) has full rank.
Proof. Let S = ‖S‖. We use Babai’s nearest plane algorithm (Babai 1986)
to ﬁnd a vector c ∈ L(S) within Euclidean distance (√n/2) · S from nSe1.
Notice that the 1 norm of c is at most
‖c‖1 ≤ ‖(nS · e1)‖1 + ‖(c− nSe1)‖1
≤ nS +√n‖c− nSe1‖
≤ 1.5 · nS .
It remains to show that Rot(c) is a non-singular matrix, or equivalently, the
n-dimensional volume of P(Rot(c)) is nonzero. Notice that P(Rot(c)) is an
almost cubic parallelepiped obtained by perturbing the main vertexes of a hy-
percube of size l = nS by at most  = (
√
n/2)S. In Micciancio (2002b) it
is shown that, for all  <
√
1− 1/n · l/√n, the minimal volume of any such


















the volume of P(Rot(c)) is nonzero, and the matrix Rot(c) has full rank. 
In Micciancio & Regev (2007), Lemma 2.19 is used to prove that the ex-
pected squared norm ‖d − c‖2 (when d is chosen according to distribution
DΛ,s,c) is at most s
2 · n. In this paper we will need a bound on the expected
value of the convolution product ‖(d − c) ⊗ x‖2. It immediately follows from
7The minimal volume (1 − )nln is achieved by the intuitive solution that shortens each
edge by . Interestingly, when  approaches l/
√
n, there are better ways to choose the
perturbations that result in smaller volumes (Micciancio 2002b).
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the result in Micciancio & Regev (2007) and inequality (2.13) that for any vec-
tor x, the expectation of ‖(d− c)⊗x‖2 is at most s2 · n2 · ‖x‖2. Below, we use
Lemma 2.19 to directly prove a stronger bound.
Lemma 3.2. For any n-dimensional lattice Λ, positive reals  ≤ 1/3, s ≥
2η(Λ) and vectors c,x ∈ Rn,
E
d∼DΛ,s,c
[‖(d− c)⊗ x‖2] ≤ s2 · n · ‖x‖2 .
Proof. Let e1, . . . , en be the standard basis of R
n. Notice that (d − c) ⊗
x = x ⊗ (d − c) = Rot(x) · (d − c), and eTi · Rot(x) = (roti(x˜))T , where
x˜ = (xn, . . . , x1)
T is the reverse of x. By linearity of expectation, we have
E
d∼DΛ,s,c










For every i = 1, . . . , n,
〈
ei, (d− c)⊗ x
〉





where ui = rot
i(x˜)/‖x‖ is a unit vector. So,
E
d∼DΛ,s,c








Using the assumption s ≥ 2η(Λ) and applying Lemma 2.19, we get that for





















Adding up for all i and substituting in the previous equation we get
E
d∼DΛ,s,c
[‖(d− c)⊗ x‖2] ≤ s2‖x‖2n . 
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4. Generalized compact knapsacks
The hash function families considered in this paper, as well as in previous works
(Ajtai 2004; Cai & Nerurkar 1997; Micciancio 2004; Micciancio & Regev 2007),
are all special cases of the following general deﬁnition.
Definition 4.1. For any ring R, subset S ⊂ R and integer m ≥ 1, the gen-





xi · ai ,
for all a ∈ Rm and x ∈ Sm, where ∑i xi ·ai is computed using the ring addition
and multiplication operations.
In this paper we consider the ring R = (Fnp(n),+,⊗) of n-dimensional vectors
over the ﬁnite ﬁeld Fp(n) with p(n) = n
Θ(1) elements, with the usual vector
addition operation and convolution product ⊗. For brevity, we will denote this
ring simply as Fnp(n). We remark that for any prime p, the ﬁeld Fp is isomorphic
to the ring Zp of integers modulo p. Here we use notation F
n
p instead of Z
n
p both
because some of our results are valid even when p is not a prime, and also to
emphasize that Fnp is the ring of vectors with the convolution product operation,
rather than the componentwise multiplication of the product ring Znp .
As for S, we consider the set S = Dn ⊂ Fnp of vectors with entries in an
appropriately selected subset of Fp. We want to study the hash function family
H(Fnp , Dn, m), and prove that it is both almost regular and one-way.
The rest of the section is organized as follows. In Section 4.1 we prove
that H(Fnp , Dn, m) is almost regular. In Section 4.2 we introduce and start
studying a new worst-case lattice problem that will be instrumental to prove
our main result. In Section 4.3 we give a reduction from solving this problem
in the worst case to the problem of inverting functions H(Fnp , Dn, m) on the
average. Finally, in Section 4.4, we use reductions among worst-case problems
to establish the hardness of inverting H(Fnp , Dn, m) on the average based on the
worst-case intractability of various standard problems (like SIVP and GDD)
on cyclic lattices.
4.1. Regularity lemma. For any ring R of size |R| ≥ 2n, a necessary con-
dition for the hash function family H(R, {0, 1}, m) to be almost regular is
m ≥ Ω(log |R|) ≥ Ω(n), because when m ≤ o(log |R|), at most a tiny fraction
of the elements of R can be expressed as the sum of a subset of {a1, . . . , am}. In
this subsection we prove that the hash function family H(Fnp , Dn, m) is almost
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regular already when m = ω(1) is an unbounded function with arbitrarily slow
growth rate. Our proof is quite diﬀerent from the standard proof for the subset-
sum function H(R, {0, 1}, m). In particular, while the proof for H(R, {0, 1}, m)
only relies on the additive structure of R, our proof makes full use of the ring
properties of Fnp and the characterization of its ideals as quotients of polynomial
rings.
Theorem 4.2. For any finite field F, subset D ⊂ F, and integers n,m, the





(1 + |F|/|D|m)n − 1 .
In particular, for any p(n) = nO(1), |D| = nΩ(1) and m(n) = ω(1), the function
ensemble H(Fnp(n), Dn, m(n)) is almost regular.
The proof of the theorem is based on the following lemma attributed to
Rackoﬀ by Impagliazzo and Zuckerman.
Lemma 4.3 (Impagliazzo & Zuckerman 1989, Claim 2). Let V, V ′ be indepen-
dent and identically distributed random variables taking values in a finite set S.
If V, V ′ have collision probability Pr {V = V ′} ≤ (1 + 42)/|S|, then the statis-
tical distance between V and the uniform distribution over S is at most .
Proof. For completeness, we give a sketch of the proof. Using the second in-























Pr{V = s} − 1/|S|)2 .













|S| · Pr{V = V ′} − 1
which is at most  under the assumption that Pr{V = V ′} ≤ (1 + 42)/|S|. 
We also need the following simple lemma.
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Lemma 4.4. Let R be a finite ring, and z1, . . . , zm ∈ R a sequence of arbi-
trary ring elements. If a1, . . . , am ∈ R are independently and uniformly dis-
tributed ring elements, then
∑
ai · zi is uniformly distributed over the ideal
〈z1, . . . , zm〉 generated by z1, . . . , zm. In particular, for any z1, . . . , zm ∈ R and
randomly chosen a1, . . . , am ∈ R, the probability that
∑
ai · zi = 0 is exactly
1/|〈z1, . . . , zm〉|.
Proof. Let z1, . . . , zm ∈ R be arbitrary ring elements, and, for any b ∈ R,
deﬁne Ab = {(a1, . . . , am) ∈ Rm :
∑
ai · zi = b}. Notice that the probability
that
∑
i ai · zi = b (over the random choice of a1, . . . , am) equals |Ab|/|R|m. If
b /∈ 〈z1, . . . , zm〉, then Ab = ∅ and Pr {
∑
ai · zi = b} = 0. It remains to prove
that all b ∈ 〈z1, . . . , zm〉 have the same probability. Let b =
∑
ai · zi be an
arbitrary element of 〈z1, . . . , zm〉. We claim that |Ab| = |A0|. It is easy to see
that a′ ∈ Ab if and only if a′−a ∈ A0. Since a′ → a′−a is a bijection between Ab
and A0, it follows that |Ab| = |A0|. This proves that all b ∈ 〈z1, . . . , zm〉 have
the same probability |Ab|/|R|m = |A0|/|R|m, and completes the proof of the
lemma. 
We are now ready to prove the theorem.
Proof of Theorem 4.2. We want to prove that owf(H(Fn, Dn, m)) is
very close to the uniform distribution over (Fn)m × Fn. We ﬁrst bound the
collision probability of two independent copies of owf(H(Fn, Dn, m)). Let
(














be two independent samples chosen according to the distribution
owf
(H(Fn, Dn, m)) .
By deﬁnition, the elements ai, a
′
i ∈ Fn and xi,x′i ∈ Dn are all chosen inde-




∀i.ai = a′i ∧
m∑
i=1






















ai ⊗ (xi − x′i) = 0
}
.
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By Lemma 4.4, the probability (over the random choice of a1, . . . , am) that∑
i ai⊗ (xi−x′i) = 0 equals 1/|I| where I = 〈x1−x′1, . . . ,xm−x′m〉 is the ideal
generated by x1 − x′1, . . . ,xm − x′m. Let I be the set of all ideals of (Fn,+,⊗).































(xi − x′i) ∈ I
}
.
In the rest of the proof, we regard Fn as the ring of univariate polynomials
F[α] modulo αn − 1. Since F is a ﬁeld, F[α] is a principal ideal domain, i.e.,
all ideals in F[α] are of the form 〈Q(α)〉 for some polynomial Q(α) ∈ F[α].
It follows that all ideals I ∈ I of the quotient ring F[α]/(αn − 1) are of the
form 〈Q(α)〉 where Q(α) is a factor of αn − 1. (To see this, given an ideal
I ∈ I, select a representative for each element of I, and let Q(α) be the
greatest common divisor of all these representatives and the polynomial αn−1.)
Let (αn − 1) = Q1(α) · Q2(α) · · · · · Qr(α) be the factorization of (αn − 1)
into irreducible polynomials over F, and for any subset S ⊆ {1, . . . , r}, let
QS(α) = Πi∈SQi(α). The ideals of R are I = {〈QS〉 : S ⊆ {1, . . . , r}}. For any
ideal 〈QS〉 ∈ I, we have |〈QS〉| = |F|n−deg(QS) and
Pr
{
(xi − x′i) ∈ 〈QS〉
}
= Pr {xi ≡ x′i mod QS}(4.5)
≤ max
x˜
Pr {xi mod QS = x˜} ≤ 1|D|deg(QS) ,
where x˜ ranges over all polynomials of degree deg(x˜) < deg(QS), and the last
inequality follows from the fact that, for any ﬁxed value of the (n− deg(QS))
higher order coeﬃcients of x, the function x → x mod QS is a bijection between
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This proves that the collision probability is at most
(1 + |F|/|D|m)n
|F|n(m+1) .
Now observe that random variable owf(H(Fn, Dn, m)) takes values in the
set (Fn)m × Fn, which has size |F|n(m+1). Therefore, by Lemma 4.3, the statis-
tical distance between owf(H(Fn, Dn, m)) and the uniform distribution over









− 1 . 
4.2. The worst case problems. We want to show that inverting our gen-
eralized compact knapsack function H(Fn, Dn, m) (on the average and with
non-negligible probability) is at least as hard as solving GDDγ (as well as
various other related problems) over cyclic lattices in the worst case. Follow-
ing Micciancio (2004), this is done in two steps. First, all relevant worst-case
lattice problems are reduced to an intermediate worst-case problem, and then
the intermediate problem is reduced to the problem of inverting functions in
H(Fn, Dn, m) on the average. In Micciancio (2004), the goal was to reduce the
worst-case problem SIVPγ to the problem of inverting
8 H(Znp , {0, 1}, m) on the
average, and the intermediate problem was an incremental version of SIVP,
where given a lattice basis B, a set of suﬃciently long linearly independent
8In fact, Micciancio (2004) only requires an algorithm that ﬁnds collisions fa(x) = fa(x′),
an easier problem than inverting the function fa.
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lattice vectors S, and a hyperplane H , the goal is to ﬁnd a lattice vector not
in H shorter than ‖S‖ by some constant factor.
Here we consider a diﬀerent intermediate problem, which is an incremental
version of GDD, where one is given a GDD instance (B, t), a set of n linearly
independent vectors S ⊂ L(B), and a suﬃciently large real parameter r, and
the goal is to ﬁnd a lattice vector whose distance from the target is at most
‖S‖/c + r for some constant c.
Definition 4.6. The incremental guaranteed distance decoding problem (de-
noted IncGDDφγ,c), given an n-dimensional lattice B, a set of n linearly inde-
pendent vectors S ⊂ L(B), a target t ∈ Rn, and a real r > γ(n) ·φ(L(B)), asks
for a lattice vector s ∈ L(B) such that ‖s− t‖ ≤ (‖S‖/c) + r.
In the rest of this subsection we show that many standard lattice problems
reduce (via lattice-preserving reductions) to IncGDD. A reduction (say, from
SIVP to IncGDD) is lattice-preserving if all calls to the IncGDD oracle are
of the form (B,S, t, r) where B is the SIVP input lattice. Lattice-preserving
reductions are particularly useful in the context of our paper because they allow
to reduce a (worst-case) lattice problem over a given class of lattices (e.g., cyclic
lattices) to another (worst-case) lattice problem over the same class of lattices.
For example, the next lemma shows that SIVP on cyclic lattices can be solved
in polynomial time given oracle access to a procedure that solves IncGDD on
cyclic lattices.
Lemma 4.7. For any γ(n) ≥ 1 and any φ, there exists a lattice-preserving
reduction from SIVPφ4γ to IncGDD
φ
γ,5.
Proof. Given a basis B, our goal is to construct a set of n linearly inde-
pendent vectors S of length ‖S‖ ≤ 4γ(n)φ(B). We do this by an iterative
process. Initially, we set S to the result of applying the LLL basis reduction
algorithm (Lenstra et al. 1982) to B, so that S is a basis for L(B) satisfying
‖S‖ ≤ 2nλn(L(B)). At each step, we identify the longest vector in S, say si.
We then take t to be a vector orthogonal to s1, . . . , si−1, si+1, . . . , sn of length
‖S‖/2. We call the IncGDD oracle with the instance (B,S, t, ‖S‖/4). If
it fails, we terminate and output S. Otherwise, we obtain a lattice vector s
within distance at most (‖S‖/5) + ‖S‖/4 = (9/20)‖S‖ from t. Notice that
‖s‖ ≤ ‖t‖ + ‖s − t‖ ≤ (19/20)‖S‖. Moreover, s is linearly independent from
{s1, . . . , si−1, si+1, . . . , sn} because it is at distance ‖t‖− ‖s− t‖ ≥ ‖S‖/20 > 0
from the hyperplane spanned by those vectors. So, we can replace si with s
and repeat the process.
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Notice that when the oracle call fails, it must be the case that ‖S‖/4 ≤
γ(n)φ(B), and hence ‖S‖ ≤ 4γ(n)φ(B), as required. It remains to bound the
running time of the reduction. Every iteration takes time polynomial in the size
of B and S, which is polynomial in the size of the original input B because S
is initially equal to a polynomial time computable function of B and ‖S‖ can
only get smaller from one iteration to the next. Finally, consider the quantity
log
∏
i ‖si‖. We know that initially ‖si‖ ≤ 2nλn(L(B)) for all i. Moreover,
log
∏
i ‖si‖ decreases by a constant (namely, log 19/20) at each iteration, and
it is always at least as large as log
∏
i min{‖si‖, (10/11)λn(L(B))}. (To see this,
observe that the vector selected for replacement at every iteration must satisfy




n) = O(n2) iterations. 
Next, we show how to use an IncGDD oracle to solve GDD.
Lemma 4.8. For any γ(n) ≥ 1 and any φ, there exists a lattice-preserving
reduction from GDDφ2γ to IncGDD
φ
γ,5.
Proof. Given a basis B and a vector t, our goal is to ﬁnd a lattice vector
within distance 2γ(n)φ(B) of t. First, we apply the reduction in Lemma 4.7 to
obtain a set S ⊂ L(B) of n linearly independent vectors of length at most ‖S‖ ≤
4γ(n)φ(B). Then, we apply the LLL basis reduction algorithm (Lenstra et al.
1982) to B to obtain a basis for the same lattice such that ‖B′‖ ≤ 2nλn(B).
Deﬁne r = (
√
n/4)‖B′‖ and call the IncGDD oracle on input (B,S, t, r).
If the oracle returns an invalid answer,9 it must be that r ≤ γ(n)φ(B), and
we can eﬃciently ﬁnd a lattice vector s within distance (
√
n/2)‖B′‖ = 2r ≤
2γ(n)φ(B) from the target t using Babai’s nearest plane algorithm (Babai
1986). So, assume the oracle call IncGDD(B,S, t, r) succeeds. We keep calling
the IncGDD oracle with smaller and smaller values of r, until either a call
returns an invalid answer or r gets too small. Speciﬁcally, at each iteration we
decrease r by a factor 10/11, as long as r > ‖S‖/4. Notice that if r ≤ ‖S‖/4 and
the oracle IncGDD(B,S, t, r) returns a valid answer s, then we can terminate
with output s because
‖s− t‖ ≤ r + ‖S‖/5 ≤ (1/4 + 1/5)‖S‖ < ‖S‖/2 ≤ 2γ(n)φ(B) .
Finally, assume that the oracle succeeds for some value of r, but fails in the next
iteration. Since the oracle fails on input (10/11)r, it must be that (10/11)r ≤
9We remark that the validity of the answer s returned by the oracle can be easily checked
by verifying that s ∈ L(B) and ‖s− t‖ ≤ r + ‖S‖/5.
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γ(n) · φ(L(B)), or, equivalently, r ≤ (11/10)γ(n) · φ(L(B)). Therefore, the
vector s returned by the oracle on input r satisﬁes




γ(n) · φ(L(B)) + 4
5
γ(n) · φ(L(B))
< 2γ(n) · φ(L(B))
as required.
This concludes the description of the reduction. The reduction is cor-
rect because in every case, it terminates with a lattice vector within distance
2γ(n)φ(L(B)) from the target. Moreover, it is clear that each iteration can
be implemented in time polynomial in the size of the original B. In order to
complete the proof we only need to make sure that the number of iterations
is also polynomial. Notice that since ‖S‖ ≥ λn(B) (by deﬁnition of λn) and
‖B′‖ ≤ 2nλn(B) (by the properties of LLL reduced basis), the number of it-




n2n) = O(n), which is
polynomial in the size of B. 
4.3. The main reduction. In this section we reduce the worst-case prob-
lem IncGDDηγ,c on cyclic lattices to the problem of inverting the generalized
compact knapsack functions H(Fnp(n), Dn, m(n)) on the average.
Our reduction is closely related to Micciancio and Regev’s variant (Mic-
ciancio & Regev 2007) of Ajtai’s original worst-case average-case connection
(Ajtai 2004) for arbitrary lattices. The average-case problem considered in Aj-
tai (2004); Micciancio & Regev (2007) is that of ﬁnding a small integer linear
dependency among randomly chosen elements of the additive group Znp . This
problem is shown to be at least as hard as ﬁnding short vectors in an arbitrary
lattice B roughly10 as follows:
1. First, the group Znp is embedded into the space spanned by the lattice B
by dividing each side of the fundamental parallelepiped P(B) into p equal
parts, yielding pn subregions naturally corresponding to the group ele-
ments.
2. Next, samples from the group Znp are chosen by selecting (almost) uni-
formly distributed vectors y′i ∈ P(B), and rounding them to the cor-
ners ai of the corresponding subregions of P(B). The fundamental idea
10Many important technical details are omitted in our informal description. The reader is
referred to the original paper Micciancio & Regev (2007) for a more accurate description.
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of Micciancio & Regev (2007) (also used in this paper) is that random
points y′i ∈ P(B) can be eﬃciently generated together with nearby lattice
vectors by choosing a relatively short random vector yi (with Gaussian
distribution), and reducing it modulo the lattice. This yields a point
y′i = yi mod B distributed almost uniformly at random within P(B),
together with a nearby lattice point (y′i − yi) ∈ L(B).
3. Since the vectors y′i are (almost) uniformly distributed over P(B), the
associated rounded vectors ai correspond to (almost) uniformly chosen
group elements in Znp . So, one can use the average-case oracle to ﬁnd
a small integer linear dependency relation (x1, . . . , xm) modulo p among
the group elements. It is easy to see that
∑
i ai · xi ∈ L(B) for any
such linear dependency relation (x1, . . . , xm). Moreover, approximating







i − yi) · xi ∈ L(B) not far from
∑
i ai · xi. So, one
can compute a short vector in the original lattice L(B) by taking the
diﬀerence
∑
i(ai − y′i + yi) · xi between these two lattice points.
The main novelty in our reduction is that we need to embed (into the space
spanned by the lattice), not just the additive group Znp , but rather the more
sophisticated ring structure (Znp ,+,⊗) of n-dimensional vectors with the usual
modular addition and new convolution product operation. Remarkably, our
reduction achieves this by exploiting the rotational symmetry of cyclic lattices.
Technically, the above reduction is modiﬁed by replacing the parallelepiped
P(B) (used to embed Znp ) with the region P(C) associated to an appropriately
chosen sublattice. Namely, C = Rot(c) is a matrix obtained by taking the
cyclic rotations of a single vector c. The reason why this small modiﬁcation
makes the reduction work is mostly algebraic, rather than purely geometric as
in Ajtai (2004); Micciancio & Regev (2007). Still, our embedding inherits some
of the geometric intuition of Ajtai’s proof (Ajtai 2004), making the Gaussian
techniques of Micciancio & Regev (2007) applicable.
Another diﬀerence between the reductions of Ajtai (2004); Micciancio &
Regev (2007) and ours, is that (for technical reasons) here we need to work
with inhomogeneous variants of both the average-case and worst-case problems.
For example, instead of considering the problem of ﬁnding a linear dependency
among ring elements (i.e., a linear combination that adds up to zero), we con-
sider the problem of inverting the generalized knapsack function (i.e., ﬁnding
a linear combination of the knapsack weights that adds up to a given random
target value). Again, the reason why this change is necessary to make our
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reduction work is mostly algebraic, not geometric.11 So, while the geometric
intuition behind Ajtai’s proof (as described above) can be useful to achieve a
superﬁcial understanding of our proof as well, we warn the reader that part
of the proof is algebraic in nature and it is best understood by putting the
geometric interpretation aside.
Theorem 4.9. For any constants c > 1 and δ > 0, negligible function (n) =
n−ω(1), polynomially bounded integers m(n) = nO(1) and primes p(n) = nO(1),
if m(n) = ω(1) and p(n) ≥ (3c ·m(n) · n2.5)1/(1−δ), then there is a probabilistic
polynomial time reduction from solving IncGDDηγ(n),c within a factor γ(n) =
3 ·m(n) · n · p(n)δ in the worst case over cyclic lattices (with high probability),
to inverting the generalized compact knapsack function H(Fnp(n), [p(n)δ]n, m(n))
on the average (with non-negligible probability).
Proof. For any instance Q = [q1, . . . ,qm(n);q0] ∈ Fn·m(n)p(n) × Fnp(n) of the















be the corresponding set of solutions. Let F be an oracle that on input an














outputs a solution F(Q) ∈ Γ(Q) with non-negligible probability. Let β(n) be
the probability that F(Q˜) ∈ Γ(Q˜) when Q˜ is selected uniformly at random from
F
n·m(n)
p(n) × Fnp(n). Since p(n) = nΘ(1), |[p(n)δ]| ≥ p(n)δ = nΩ(1) and m(n) = ω(1),
by Theorem 4.2 the probability distribution owf(H(Fnp(n), [p(n)δ]n, m(n))) is
statistically close to the uniform one U(F
n·m(n)
p(n) × Fnp(n)). Therefore, β(n) is
non-negligible too. We use F to solve problem IncGDDηγ,c over cyclic lattices
in the worst case, with non-negligible probability Ω(β(n)). Since we are solving
IncGDDηγ,c in the worst case, the success probability of the reduction can be
made exponentially close to 1 using standard repetition techniques.
11It has been recently shown (Lyubashevsky & Micciancio 2006; Peikert & Rosen 2006)
that the problem of adapting our reduction to the homogeneous setting is intimately related
to the factorization of (αn− 1) into irreducible polynomials over Z[α]. The reader is referred
to Lyubashevsky & Micciancio (2006); Peikert & Rosen (2006) for details.
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Let (B,S, t, r) be a valid IncGDDηγ,c instance such that the lattice L(B)
is cyclic. We know that L(S) is a (not necessarily cyclic) full rank sublattice
of L(B), and r > γ(n) · η(n)(L(B)) for some negligible function (n) = n−ω(1).
The goal of the reduction is to ﬁnd a lattice vector s ∈ L(B) within distance
r + ‖S‖/c from the target t. The reduction works as follows:
1. Use Lemma 3.1 to ﬁnd a vector c ∈ L(S) ⊆ L(B) of length ‖c‖1 ≤
2 · n · ‖S‖ such that Rot(c) has full rank.
2. For i = 0, . . . , m(n), do the following
(a) Use Lemma 2.10 to generate a uniformly random lattice vector vi ∈
L(B) ∩ P(Rot(c)):
(b) Generate a random noise vector yi with probability density yi ∼
ρs/s
n for s = 2r/γ(n), and let y′i = yi mod B.
(c) Compute ai = p(n) ·Rot(c)−1(vi + y′i).
3. Compute b = p(n) ·Rot(c)−1t.
4. Deﬁne the generalized compact knapsack problem instance
(4.10) Q =
[
a1 mod p(n), . . . , am(n) mod p(n); a0 + b mod p(n)
]
and invoke F(Q) to ﬁnd a potential solution X = [x1, . . . ,xm(n)] ∈ Γ(Q).












⊗ xi + c⊗ b
p(n)
.
The correctness of the reduction is based on the following two lemmas. The
ﬁrst lemma shows that if the oracle F successfully outputs a solutionX ∈ Γ(Q),
then the reduction outputs a lattice vector s ∈ L(B).
Lemma 4.11. If X ∈ Γ(Q), then s ∈ L(B) is a lattice vector.
Proof. Let X ∈ Γ(Q) be a valid solution to knapsack instance (4.10). In




ai ⊗ xi ≡ (a0 + b) mod p(n) .
12In fact, this is the only property of X required in this lemma. The other property
∀i.xi ∈ [p(n)δ]n is not used in the proof.
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i − yi)⊗ xi − c⊗
∑m(n)
i=0 ai ⊗ xi − b
p(n)
.
We claim that all terms in the summation belong to the lattice L(B). First of
all notice that for any i ≥ 0, the vector vi +y′i−yi belongs to the lattice L(B)
because vi ∈ L(B) and y′i ≡ yi modulo L(B). Using the cyclicity of L(B), we
get that all columns of Rot(vi + y
′
i − yi) belong to the lattice, and
(vi + y
′
i − yi)⊗ xi = Rot(vi + y′i − yi) · xi ∈ L(B)
because xi has integer entries. For the last term, we use equalities (4.12) and
a0 ⊗ x0 = −a0, yielding
∑
i≥0
ai ⊗ xi − b =
∑
i≥1
ai ⊗ xi − (a0 + b) ≡ 0 mod p(n) .
Therefore (
∑
i≥0 ai ⊗ xi − b)/p(n) is an integer vector, and
c⊗
∑




i≥0 ai ⊗ xi − b
p(n)
∈ L(Rot(c)) ⊆ L(B)
belongs to the lattice. 
The second lemma shows that the input Q to the oracle F is almost uni-
formly distributed, and therefore F(Q) is successful with probability very close
to β(n).
Lemma 4.13. For any s ≥ η(n)(L(B)), the statistical distance ofQ (as defined





) · (n) .
In particular, for any polynomially bounded m(n) = nO(1), and negligible func-
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Proof. We ﬁrst bound the distance of each ai mod p(n) from the uniform
distribution over Fnp(n). Notice that
ai mod p(n) = p(n) · Rot(c)−1(vi + y′i) mod p(n)
=
⌊
p(n) ·Rot(c)−1((vi + y′i) mod Rot(c)
)⌋
.
So, if y′i were distributed uniformly at random over P(B), then (vi + y′i) mod
Rot(c) would be uniform over P(Rot(c)), and ai mod p(n) would also have per-
fectly uniform distribution over Fnp(n). Consider ai mod p(n) as a randomized
function of y′i, i.e., deﬁne the randomized function g(y
′) = p(n) ·Rot(c)−1(v+
y′) mod p(n) where v ∈ L(B) ∩ P(Rot(c)) is chosen uniformly at random.
Notice that g(y′i) = ai mod p(n). We observed that g maps the uniform dis-
tribution over P(B) to the uniform distribution over Fnp(n), i.e., g(U(P(B))) =
U(Fnp(n)). Therefore, by Proposition 2.2 the statistical distance between ai mod
p(n) and the uniform distribution over Fnp(n) is at most
Δ
(

















Notice that y′i has distribution ρs/s
n mod P(B). Using the assumption s ≥
η(L(B)) and Lemma 2.18, we get that
Δ
(









Now consider the knapsack instance Q deﬁned in (4.10). Since the elements























The last term satisﬁes
Δ
(



































≤ (m(n) + 1) · (n)/2 . 
We are now ready to prove the correctness of the reduction. Namely, we
want to prove that for any n-dimensional cyclic lattice basis B, full rank subset
S ⊂ L(B), target t, and r > γ(n) · η(L(B)), the reduction outputs a lattice
vector s ∈ L(B) such that ‖s− t‖ ≤ r + ‖S‖/c with non-negligible probability
Ω(β(n)). By Lemma 4.11, s ∈ L(B) is satisﬁed whenever oracle F returns a
valid solution X = F(Q) ∈ Γ(Q). Therefore, the success probability of the
reduction is at least
Pr
{











X ∈ Γ(Q)} · Pr
{




∣ X ∈ Γ(Q)
}
.
Let Q˜ ∈ U(Fn×m(n)p(n) × Fnp(n)) be an instance distributed uniformly at random.
Notice that s = 2r/γ(n) > 2η(n)(L(B)) > η(n)(L(B)). So, by Lemma 4.13,
Δ(Q, Q˜) is negligible. Therefore, the ﬁrst probability in (4.14) satisﬁes
Pr
{






= β(n)− n−ω(1) ≥ Ω(β(n)) .
We bound the second probability in (4.14) using Markov’s inequality:
Pr
{













∣ X ∈ Γ(Q)
}
≥ 1− E
[ ‖s− t‖ X ∈ Γ(Q) ]
r + ‖S‖/c .
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We will prove that the conditional expectation E
[ ‖s− t‖ X ∈ Γ(Q) ] is at














This proves that (4.14) (and therefore also the success probability of the reduc-
tion) is at least Ω(β(n)) · Ω(1) = Ω(β(n)). It remains to bound the expected



































We will show that the ﬁrst and third term can be made arbitrarily small by
using a suﬃciently large value for p(n). (Here is where we use the assumption
p(n) ≥ (3cm(n)n2.5)1/(1−δ).) The second term requires the most eﬀort and it is







c⊗ (w − w)
p(n)
where w = p(n) Rot(c)−1(vi + y′i). Since ‖c‖1 ≤ 2n‖S‖ by construction and
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Substituting (4.18) and (4.19) in (4.16), and using the second inequality in
(2.12)
















‖yi ⊗ xi‖ .
Using the assumption p(n) ≥ (3c ·m(n) · n2.5)1/(1−δ), the ﬁrst term in the last
expression is at most































so that the expectation of ‖s− t‖ is at most (2/3)(1 + 2/m(n))(r + ‖S‖/c) as
claimed.
In order to prove (4.21) we ﬁx the value of X, Q and Y′ = [y′0, . . . ,y
′
m(n)],
and consider the conditional expectation of ‖s− t‖ given all these values. We
will show that for any ﬁxed Q, X andY′ (satisfying X ∈ Γ(Q)), the conditional
expectation of ‖s−t‖ satisﬁes the bound in (4.21). Equation (4.21) immediately
follows by averaging over all possible values of Q, X and Y′ such that X ∈
Γ(Q). So, in the rest of the proof, we ﬁx the value of Q, X and Y′, and consider
the conditional distribution of the vectors yi. Notice that, given y
′
i, vector yi
must necessarily belong to the set y′i + L(B), but it is otherwise random and
independent from Q, X, Y′ and all other yj’s. So, the conditional distribution





















In other words, the conditional distribution of (yi − y′i) ∈ L(B) is DL(B),s,−y′i.
Recall that s = 2r/γ(n) > 2η(n)(L(B)). So, by Lemma 3.2,
E










≤ s2n2 · p(n)2δ .
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By convexity, we get
E
[ ‖yi ⊗ xi‖ y′i
] ≤ n · s · p(n)δ .
Finally, adding up for all values of i and using the deﬁnition of s = 2r/γ(n)




[ ‖yi ⊗ xi‖ y′i
] ≤ (m(n) + 1) · n · s · p(n)δ
=


















This concludes the proof that the conditional expectation of ‖s − t‖ given
X ∈ Γ(Q) is at most (2/3)(1+2/m(n))(r+‖S‖/c), and the reduction succeeds
with non-negligible probability Ω(β(n)). 
By choosing a small enough δ > 0 in the previous theorem, we obtain the
following corollary.
Corollary 4.22. For every α > 0 there is a δ > 0 such that for every con-
stant c > 1, negligible function (n) > 0, primes p(n) = Θ(n3), and subpoly-
nomial integers m(n) = no(1) satisfying m(n) = ω(1), there is a probabilistic
polynomial time reduction from solving IncGDDηγ,c in the worst case within
a factor γ(n) = n1+α to inverting H(Fnp(n), [p(n)δ]n, m(n)) on the average with
non-negligible probability.
Proof. Assume without loss of generality that α < 1/2, and take for exam-
ple δ = α/6. Notice that p(n)1−δ ≥ Θ(n3−α/2) is asymptotically bigger than
3cm(n)n2.5 ≤ O(n3−α). Therefore, for all suﬃciently large n, p(n) satisﬁes
the hypothesis of Theorem 4.9, and inverting H(Fnp(n), [p(n)δ]n, m(n)) on the
average is at least as hard as solving IncGDDηγ,c in the worst case, for
γ(n) = 3m(n)np(n)δ ≤ n1+o(1)+α/2 ≤ n1+α . 
4.4. Other lattice problems. In Section 4.3 we have shown that inverting
the generalized compact knapsack functions H(Fnp , [pδ]n, ω(1)) on the average
is at least as hard as solving the IncGDD problem over cyclic lattices in the
worst case. In this subsection we relate the complexity of inverting the com-
pact knapsack functions to well known worst-case lattice problems restricted
to cyclic lattices.
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Corollary 4.23. For any α > 0 there is a δ > 0 such that for all primes
p(n) = Θ(n3) and integers m(n) = no(1) satisfying m(n) = ω(1), inverting
H(Fnp(n), [p(n)δ]n, m(n)) on the average with non-negligible probability is at
least as hard as solving any of the following problems in the worst case within
a factor γ(n) = n1+α:
◦ the guaranteed distance decoding problem GDDηγ over cyclic lattices
◦ the generalized independent vector problem SIVPηγ over cyclic lattices.
Proof. Both reductions easily follow by combining Corollary 4.22 with the
reductions in Lemma 4.7 and Lemma 4.8. 
Finally, using known relations between η and λn (see Lemma 2.20) and
λn ≤ 2ρ (see Micciancio & Goldwasser (2002, Theorem 7.9)), we can relate
the hardness of breaking one-way function H(Fnp , [pδ]n, ω(1)) to the standard
version of the lattice problems GDD and SIVP.
Corollary 4.24. For any α > 0 there is a δ > 0 such that for any primes
p(n) = Θ(n3) and integers m(n) = no(1) satisfying m(n) = ω(1), inverting
H(Fnp(n), [p(n)δ]n, m(n)) on the average with non-negligible probability is at
least as hard as solving any of the following problems in the worst case for
γ(n) = n1+α:
◦ the guaranteed distance decoding problem GDDγ over cyclic lattices,
◦ the shortest independent vector problem SIVPγ over cyclic lattices.
5. Remarks and open problems
We have introduced a new class of very eﬃcient one-way functions with strong
security guarantees. Namely, our functions are provably hard to invert (on the
average), based on a worst-case intractability assumption. The assumption is
that no polynomial time algorithm can approximate SIVP, GDD, or other
related lattice problems, in the worst case over cyclic lattices within a factor
n1+ almost linear in the dimension of the lattice.
Similarly to the case of general lattices (Ajtai 2004; Cai & Nerurkar 1997;
Goldreich et al. 1996; Micciancio 2004; Micciancio & Regev 2007), our results
too can be interpreted as a connection between the worst-case and average-
case complexity of various lattice problems. In Ajtai (2004); Cai & Nerurkar
(1997); Goldreich et al. (1996); Micciancio (2004); Micciancio & Regev (2007)
it is shown that ﬁnding small nonzero integer solutions to a random linear
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equation Ax = 0 mod p on the average is at least as hard as solving SIVP
and other lattice problems in the worst case. Since the integer solutions to the
equation
Λ(A) = {x : Ax = 0 mod p}
form a lattice, the results in Ajtai (2004); Cai & Nerurkar (1997); Goldreich
et al. (1996); Micciancio (2004); Micciancio & Regev (2007) can be formulated
as a reduction from solving SIVP in the worst case to solving SVP on the
average.
In this paper we have shown that inverting our generalized compact knap-
sack functions on the average is at least as hard as the worst case instance
of GDD, as well as other lattice problems, over cyclic lattices. We now show
how inverting the compact knapsack function can also be formulated as a lat-
tice problem. A compact knapsack function a1, . . . , am implicitly deﬁnes a
lattice in dimension O(m · n) given by the set of all (yT1 , . . . ,yTm)T such that∑
ai ⊗ yi = 0. In fact, using matrix notation, one can consider the weights
a1, . . . , am as a compact representation of an n×m · n matrix
A =
[
Rot(a1)| . . . |Rot(am)
]
which deﬁnes a lattice Λ(A) = {x : Ax = 0 mod p} in the usual way. Up
to a permutation of the coordinates, it is immediate to see that the lattice
associated to matrix A above is quasi-cyclic of order m, i.e., it is invariant
under shifts rotm by m positions. Inverting the subset-sum function can be
formulated as a closest vector problem instance as follows. Given a1, . . . , am,
and knapsack target b, we ﬁrst compute an arbitrary solution z = (z1, . . . , zm)
to the equation
∑
ai ⊗ zi = b. (These vectors zi are not required to belong
to S = Dn, and can be eﬃciently found.) Then, ﬁnding small vectors x =
(x1, . . . ,xm) such that
∑
ai ⊗ xi = b is equivalent to ﬁnding lattice vectors
(z1 − x1, . . . , zm − xm) ∈ Λ(A) close to (z1, . . . , zm).
So, our result can be interpreted as follows: if GDD on n-dimensional cyclic
lattices is hard to approximate within n1+ factors in the worst case, then CVP
on ω(n) dimensional ω(1)-cyclic lattices is hard to solve on the average.
Many open problems remain. First and foremost, since the security of the
cryptographic function proposed in this paper relies on the hardness of lattice
problems on cyclic lattices, it would be very interesting to investigate the worst
case complexity of computational problems on cyclic lattices, as discussed in the
introduction. In the rest of this section we describe other open problems (and
recent results) concerning the construction of various cryptographic primitives
and improvement of the worst-case inapproximability factor required by the
proof of security.
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Cryptographic applications. From a practical point of view, it would be
nice to prove that our function satisﬁes stronger security guarantees than one-
wayness. For the case of general lattices, it is known (Goldreich et al. 1996;
Micciancio & Regev 2007) that under the assumption that SIVP is hard to
approximate in the worst case within almost linear factors ω(n logn), the gen-
eralized subset-sum function over Znp is not only one-way, but also collision
resistant. Unfortunately, technical diﬀerences between our proof and the one
in Micciancio & Regev (2007) make it hard to establish the same result for
the compact knapsack function. At the time this paper was written, we left as
an open problem to prove or disprove that our generalized compact knapsack
function is collision resistant. This problem has been independently settled in
Lyubashevsky & Micciancio (2006) and Peikert & Rosen (2006), where it is
shown that the generalized compact knapsack function proposed in this pa-
per is not collision resistant (in fact, it is not even a universal one-way hash
function), but it can be turned into a collision resistant hash function (under
essentially the same worst-case complexity assumption) by suitably restricting
its domain or modifying the underlying ring. In Lyubashevsky & Micciancio
(2006); Peikert & Rosen (2006) it is also shown that the function is secure
even when the number of weights m(n) = O(1) is constant, improving over the
almost constant bound m(n) = ω(1) used in this paper.
It would be interesting to use the techniques developed in this paper to build
(very eﬃcient) cryptographic primitives other than one-way functions and col-
lision resistant hash functions. One-way functions are known to be suﬃcient
to build many other useful cryptographic primitives, like pseudo-random gen-
erators (Goldreich & Levin 1989; H˚astad et al. 1999), one-way hash functions
(Naor & Yung 1989), commitment schemes (Naor 1991), digital signatures
schemes (Rompel 1990), or private key encryption schemes (Goldreich et al.
1986). However, these generic constructions are rather ineﬃcient, so with their
use most of the eﬃciency beneﬁts of our compact knapsack function would
be lost. We leave as an open problem the construction of any such provably
secure cryptographic primitive with eﬃciency comparable to our one-way func-
tion, and based on similar worst-case intractability assumptions. As already
mentioned above, for the case of hash functions, this problem has been recently
solved in Lyubashevsky & Micciancio (2006); Peikert & Rosen (2006), where it
is shown that a simple variant of the function proposed in this paper is collision
resistant, and therefore also a one-way hash function. We also observe that by
standard reductions (Damg˚ard et al. 1997; Naor & Yung 1989), the collision re-
sistant hash functions of Lyubashevsky & Micciancio (2006); Peikert & Rosen
(2006) also yield eﬃcient constructions of (statistically hiding) commitment
schemes based on the worst-case hardness of cyclic lattices.
404 Micciancio cc 16 (2007)
Finally, and probably the hardest of the open problems concerning the cryp-
tographic applicability of our techniques, is to build a public-key encryption
scheme (or a trapdoor function) with eﬃciency and security guarantees simi-
lar to our compact knapsack function. Building public-key encryption schemes
seems a much harder problem than building one-way functions or private key
encryptions. Still, we believe that designing public-key encryption schemes
with eﬃciency and security properties similar to our one-way function may not
be so out of reach. We remark that the class of cyclic lattices used in this
paper is related to (although diﬀerent from) the class of “convolutional mod-
ular lattices” used by NTRU (Hoﬀstein et al. 1998), a commercial public-key
cryptosystem based on lattices. Speciﬁcally, the lattices used by NTRU can
be described as quasi-cyclic lattices of order 2, i.e., lattices that are invari-
ant under cyclic shifts by 2 positions. Unfortunately, no proof of security is
known for NTRU (even based on nontrivial average-case complexity assump-
tions). Still, based on the similarities between NTRU and other lattice-based
cryptosystems (Micciancio 2001b), we hope that, as Ajtai’s one-way function
(Ajtai 2004) inspired the design of public-key cryptosystems (Ajtai & Dwork
1997; Regev 2004b), our work will provide a starting point for the design of
eﬃcient and provably secure public-key cryptosystems based on cyclic lattices.
Proving the security of NTRU, or ﬁnding alternative ways to build public-key
cryptosystems with eﬃciency and security properties similar to our one-way
function is left as an open problem.
Improving the connection factor. The worst-case inapproximability fac-
tor for SIVP and GDD required by our one-way function is n1+, for arbi-
trarily small  > 0. A modest improvement has been recently achieved in
Lyubashevsky & Micciancio (2006); Peikert & Rosen (2006), who proved that
(a variant of) the generalized compact knapsack proposed in this paper is as
hard to invert on the average (in fact, even collision resistant) as approximat-
ing SIVP (on cyclic lattices) within a factor n logO(1) n, essentially matching
similar results for general lattices (Micciancio & Regev 2007). An interesting
open question is whether it is possible to do even better than that. We remark
that the worst-case problems solved by our reduction are somehow harder than
SIVP and GDD. Our reduction allows to solve SIVPη and GDDη within
almost linear factors, and then uses known relations between the smoothing
parameter η and standard lattice parameters like λn and ρ. An interesting
question is whether better relations between η, λn and ρ can be proved in the
case of cyclic lattices.
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For the case of GDD, we showed how to solve GDDλn within almost linear
factors n1+, and then used the inequality ρ ≥ λn/2 to express our result
in terms of GDD = GDDρ. Since ρ can be larger than λn by
√
n/2 (even
for the case of cyclic lattices), our reduction may approximate GDD within
factors much smaller than n1+, potentially as low as n0.5+, depending on
the input lattice. We leave as an open problem to prove that the generalized
compact knapsack function is as hard to invert as approximating GDD over
cyclic lattices in the worst case within factors γ(n) = n0.5+.
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